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Abstract
While E-commerce has been growing explosively and online shopping has be-
come popular and even dominant in the present era, online transaction fraud
control has drawn considerable attention in business practice and academic re-
search. Conventional fraud control considers mainly the interactions of two
major involved decision parties, i.e. merchants and fraudsters, to make fraud
classification decisions without paying much attention to dynamic looping effect
arose from the decisions made by other profit-related parties. This paper pro-
poses a novel fraud control framework that can quantify interactive effects of
decisions made by different parties and can adjust fraud control strategies us-
ing data analytics, artificial intelligence, and dynamic optimization techniques.
Three control models, Naive, Myopic and Prospective Controls, were developed
based on the availability of data attributes and levels of label maturity. The
proposed models are purely data-driven and self-adaptive in a real-time man-
ner. The field test on Microsoft real online transaction data suggested that new
systems could sizably improve the company’s profit.
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1. Introduction
As E-commerce has grown explosively in recent years, many merchants have
been providing some centralized platforms for consumers to buy products with
”One-Click”. Although online (card-not-present) type of transactions have of-
fered the great benefit of consumer convenience, it also has increased the high
risk of transaction frauds. As a result, merchants unavoidably have to employ
many resources to develop an effective and efficient mechanism for fraud detec-
tion and transaction risk control. These control systems usually consist of two
core engines: a risk scoring engine and a risk control engine.
The risk scoring engine is designed to measure the risk level of each trans-
action. Instead of assigning a transaction with explicit 0-1 (legitimacy - fraud)
classification, the majority of merchants calculate the risk score for each trans-
action based on its attributes, such as purchase price, order quantity, payment
information, product market, etc. Whenever a transaction with a higher score
is seen, it is more likely to be fraudulent. With the help of big data and machine
learning technologies, the modern scoring model has been significantly improved
using streaming historical data.
The risk control engine gets involved once a risk score is calculated. Some
transactions that violate predetermined policies or rules get instantly rejected.
These predetermined rules and policies are set due to some governments and
merchants made regulations, or they are needed when some obvious frauds re-
quire immediate blockade. However, the majority of frauds fail to be restrained
by these rules, so the risk control engine needs to step in and further prevent
more fraudulent transactions using the risk scores. Conventional risk controls
apply static risk cut-off score thresholds: approve transactions with risk scores
lower than the low score threshold; reject transactions with scores higher than
the high score threshold; utilize human intelligence (manual review) for fur-
ther investigations on transactions with the risk scores in-between. The cut-off
score thresholds are set so that the inline fraud detection system can optimally
prevent fraudsters’ attacks. This threshold band method is widely applied in
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e-commerce merchants and financial institutions. Despite the fact that the
method of risk score evaluation has been significantly improved during the past
few years, due to the following three main reasons decisions made by risk scores
are still not always reliable: 1) Rapid changes in fraudsters’ behavior patterns;
2) Loss of fraud signals from rejected transactions, and; 3) Long data matu-
rity lead time. Because of these issues, the conventional fraud control engine
lacks for flexibility and capability of real-time self-adjustment, and hence cannot
always provide the most accurate risk decisions.
Our research motivation for this paper stemmed not only from the drawbacks
of the current fraud control systems but also from the broader view of various
risk control parties who contribute to the final decisions in different transac-
tion flows. Merchants’ risk control decision making should not be isolated from
the entire decision environment, where payment issuing banks and manual re-
view teams make follow-up decisions that constitute the final decisions on every
transaction. Figure 1 depicts how a transaction is processed through different
decision stations until it reaches its final decision.
Figure 1: Transaction flow demonstration
When a transaction arrives, the risk scoring engine calculates its risk level
score based on all its associated features.The risk control engine then makes a
decision (approval, rejection, MR review) using some important attributes of
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this transaction (including its risk score). If the transaction is approved by the
risk control engine, it is then sent to the bank for the follow-up decision (a
bank authorized transaction is marked as Final Approval, and a bank declined
transaction is marked as Final Rejection). If the transaction is rejected by the
risk control engine, it is directly marked as Final Rejection. If the transaction
is not approved nor rejected by the risk control engine, it would also be sent to
the bank first. Only if the bank authorizes the transaction, it has the chance
to reach to the manual review (MR) agents for further investigation and for
its final decision (a transaction that is authorized by bank and approved is
marked as Final Approval, and marked Final Rejection otherwise). The blue
box indicates the target of this research, and the grey boxes point out other
involved decision-making parties.
Banks are regarded as a single decision party for simplicity. From the data,
we found that when the risk control engine approved and submitted trans-
actions that included more frauds (false negative: wrongful approval) to the
banks, when banks sensed it, they became more conservative and would de-
cree more rejections of good transactions (false positive: wrongful rejection).
Data also showed that when the risk control engine submitted transactions that
included fewer frauds (true negative: rightful approval) to the manual review
(MR) teams, manual review teams tended to have much harder time to make
accurate risk decisions since fraud patterns are less massive and recognizable.
Interactions of different decision parties, legitimate customers and fraudsters
are demonstrated in Figure 2.
Considering the high total dollar amount of e-commerce transactions taking
place in this such rapidly changing risk decision environment, there is a strong
need to design a fraud control engine that can conquer all the aforementioned
challenges and optimize the decision accuracy so that the higher profit can be
reached. In this paper, the proposed control framework is designed to achieve
the following:
(i) Adaptive learning: the proposed risk control engine is trained using stream-
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Figure 2: Demonstration of interactions among decision parties and buyers/fraudsters
ing transaction records which might include some incomplete information
such as the immature label, and it can adaptively recognize the new deci-
sion environment;
(ii) Discriminative control: instead of using static uniform cut-off thresholds,
the proposed control system can assign inline decision (Approve, Reject
or Manual Review) in a real-time manner based on the attributes of each
incoming transaction;
(iii) Data-driven: the risk control is entirely data-driven which helps avoid
unreliable ad hoc human-made hard-coding rules on risk decisions.
The field test on Microsoft real online transaction data suggested that the pro-
posed control system could significantly improve the company’s profit by reduc-
ing the loss caused by inaccurate decisions (including both wrongful approvals
and wrongful rejections).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 previous research
work related to fraud control is first outlined and the existence of the research
gap is discussed. In Section 3 the Perfect State Dynamic Model with rigorous
mathematical formulation are introduced and the intractableness of the model
is then discussed. Three approximate dynamic control models are proposed in
Section 4, and the test results of their performance are included in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes this paper.
5
2. Related Research
Online shopping fraud detection research using machine learning methodolo-
gies started from early 90’s right after the occurrence of E-commerce, in which
the major research task was to evaluate fraud risk levels of transactions. Fraud
risk level was measured using risk scores, and thus the research on risk scoring
gained widespread attention. These scoring engines were inspired by neural net-
work [1, 2, 3], decision tree [4, 5, 6], random forest [7], network approach [8] and
deep neural network [9]. Readers who are interested in this topic may also refer
to [10] and references therein for other related papers that discussed different
scoring methods. Despite the fact that current research admits the fact that
fraud patterns keep changing and fraud risk scores are not always that reliable,
no existing papers discuss how to optimally utilize these scores in fraud control
operations. On the other hand, data mining papers provide weak guidance in
detailed operations, as risk score is indeed a blur expression of fraud. There is
currently no literature demonstrating how to deal with the transactions in ”gray
zone”, where the risk score of a transaction is neither too low nor too high. Ad-
ditionally, no literature has addressed interactions of decisions made by multiple
parties for transaction risk control. The main reason of lack of related literature
is that e-commerce data are strictly confidential and thus very limited access
are granted for academic researches. Our this paper fills the gaps between the
transaction fraud evaluation and the systematic risk control operations.
Dynamic control research started from the 1940’s. We suggest [11] and [12]
for comprehensive introduction to dynamic optimal control methods, as well
as their applications in communication, inventory control, production planning,
quality control, etc.. In this research, we investigated an important segment
of the dynamic control research, dynamic optimal control with incomplete in-
formation, as the main technical foundation of our paper which targeted the
challenge of some fraud control systems that can only obtain and utilize par-
tially mature data for modeling. One previous related research is Partially Ob-
served Markovian Decision Process (POMDP). POMDP is a sequential decision-
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making model that deals with inaccurate and incomplete observations of the
system state or decision environment. It models/infers transition probability
matrix, and the underlying relationship between partially observed and true
states (fully observed) information. However, POMDP brings in the significant
computational challenges and often requires carefully designed heuristic algo-
rithms to achieve sub-optimal solutions. Structural properties of the reward
function and computational algorithms of POMDP are available in [13], [14],
[15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20] and [21]. Another related research in dynamic con-
trol with incomplete information is Adaptive Dynamic Programming (ADP).
ADP assumes that perfect information is not known a priori and needs to be
gradually learned from historical data or feedback signals of the dynamic sys-
tem. ADP concepts started from 1970’s and contributed as one of the core
methods in reinforcement learning. In this paper, we will only highlight a num-
ber of papers addressing Actor-Critic structure, one branch of ADP research
that is closer in respect to the depth and width of our research. Readers who
are interested in ADP should refer to [22] for a comprehensive review of ADP
with respect to theoretical developments as well as application studies. The
Actor-Critic structure was first proposed in [23], which suggested an optimal
control of learning while improving. Actor-Critic structure implies two steps:
an actor applies an action to the environment and receives feedback from a critic;
Action improvement is then guided by the evaluation signal feedback. The deci-
sion environment feedback is recognized and reinforced after receiving feedback
rewards with neural network ([24],[25] and [26]), probabilistic models [27] for
bandit, Monto Carlo and Approximate MDP methods) and other stochastic
models [28]. There are two main challenges in solving ADP: (1) curse of dimen-
sionality: as the dimensions of state space and action space get extremely high,
a large amount of information must be stored and it makes the computational
cost grows explosively [29]; (2) Implicit form of objective functions: reward/cost
function in dynamic control does not have an explicit form, which needs to be
carefully approximated [30]. Powell introduced several parametric approxima-
tion methods to mitigate curse of dimensionality in [29] . Powell et al. in [30]
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proposed general dynamic control heuristics in ADP, including myopic control
and lookahead control with different approximation schemes for cost function
and decision environment transition probabilities, while decision environment is
learned using local searching, regression or Bayesian methods with either offline
or online fashion.
Our research is motivated by the current research gap in risk management
literatures. Problem formulations in Section 3 is supported by POMDP litera-
tures, and heuristic solution algorithms are inspired by the ideas in ADP litera-
tures. We studied some realistic issues in fraud control domain, and adapted the
general POMDP models and ADP heuristics to fit the structure of fraud control
problem. The model and algorithms proposed in this paper are not limited to
the application of transaction fraud control, and can be easily extended to other
fraud control and defense applications in finance, healthcare, electrical system,
robotics, and homeland security.
3. Problem Formulation
In this section, we rigorously formulate the dynamic control model assuming
that the state information and the state transition information in the dynamic
control model can be exactly characterized. However, the state information
and the state transition probabilities in perfect state model, called (Perfect) in
Section 3.1, are not explicit, which need to be approximated from incomplete
streaming data. Section 3.2 discusses challenges in solving the dynamic model.
3.1. Perfect State Dynamic Model
We first focus and investigate the expected profit in transaction level, which
are the building blocks of the control system. Let s, m and c denote risk score,
profit margin and costs (cost of goods, manual review costs, chargeback fine,
etc.) respectively. s has a finite integral support [s¯] = {0, 1, ..., s¯ − 1, s¯} with
upper bound s¯, and m ∈ R, c ∈ R are real numbers. According to system
logistics shown in Figure 1, profits of approval (app), review (rev) and rejection
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(rej) of this transaction w = (s,m, c) can be formulated as follow:
Rapp(w) =δw( Bank Auth. ∩ Non-fraud) ·m− δw( Bank Auth. ∩ Fraud) · c
Rrev(w) =δw( Bank Auth. ∩ MR App. ∩ Non-fraud) ·m
− δw( Bank Auth. ∩ MR App. ∩ Fraud) · c− δw( Bank Auth.) · c0
Rrej(w) =0
where c0 is unit labor cost for each manual review, and δ(·) is the indicator
function, i.e. given event H,
δ(H) =
 1 if H is true;0 if H is false.
Given the fact that risk score is a comprehensive evaluation of the risk level,
which is estimated using thousands of transaction attributes, we assume that
for any two transactions that have the same risk score s, i.e. w = (s,m, c) and
w′ = (s,m′, c′), the interactive effect of bank or MR are identical, which can be
expressed in the mathematical form as,
Pr(H | w) = Pr(H | s) = Pr(H | w′) (1)
With Eq.(1), the expected profit for each risk operation for transaction w can
be derived as
E[Rapp(w)] =Pr(Bank Auth. ∩ Non-fraud | s) ·m
− Pr(Bank Auth. ∩ Fraud | s) · c
=g1(s) ·m− g2(s) · c (2a)
E[Rrev(w)] =Pr(Bank Auth. ∩ MR App. ∩ Non-fraud | s) ·m
− Pr(Bank Auth. ∩ MR App. ∩ Fraud | s) · c
− Pr(Bank Auth. | s) · c0
=g3(s) ·m− g4(s) · c− g5(s) · c0 (2b)
E[Rrej(w)] =0. (2c)
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g-functions in Eq.(2a)-(2c) are probabilities of different events given risk score
s. g-function is short for gold function, whose values represent profit-related
probabilities associated with different risk decisions.
We further delve into a realistic dynamic system, in which banks and MR de-
cision behaviors are changing dynamically. We consider a discrete time dynamic
control model with infinite time horizon T . Let w(t) = {w(t)1 , w(t)2 , ..., w(t)N(t)} be
a set of transactions occurred during period t ∈ T . Elements of this transaction
set w
(t)
j = (s
(t)
j ,m
(t)
j , c
(t)
j ) include the risk score s
(t)
j , margin m
(t)
j and costs c
(t)
j
of this jth transaction in period t. Let N (t) be the total number of transac-
tions occurred during period t, so N (t) is then a random variable. We can then
formally define the dynamic control model as follow.
• State space: S = {(g1(s), g2(s), g3(s), g4(s), g5(s) : s ∈ [s¯])}, which is a
set of 5 g-functions values at all risk scores. In period t, the state can be
expressed as S(t) = (g
(t)
1 (s), g
(t)
2 (s), g
(t)
3 (s), g
(t)
4 (s), g
(t)
5 (s) : s ∈ [s¯]).
• Action space in period t: A(t) = {app, rev, rej}N(t) , which has 3N(t) fea-
sible decision sequences. Let a(t) = {a(t)1 , a(t)2 , ..., a(t)N(t)} be one feasible
action sequence in period t, and for the jth transaction, risk control en-
gine can choose action a
(t)
j ∈ {app, rev, rej}.
• State transition probability matrix: Q(a) = [QS,S′(a) : ∀S, S′], where
QS,S′(a) is the probability that system move from state S to state S
′
when taking action sequence a. We assume that Q(a) is fixed but implicit
through out this paper.
Let u(S(t)) be the reward-to-go function at the beginning of period t, then this
stochastic dynamic model can be formulated with Bellman’s equation as
u(S(t)) = max
a(t)∈A(t)
E
N(t)∑
j=1
R
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j , S
(t))

+α ·
∑
s(t+1)
QS(t),S(t+1)(a
(t)) · u(S(t+1))
}
(Perfect)
10
where α is a discount factor of future rewards, and reward function can be
formulated as
R
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j , S
(t)) =

g
(t)
1 (s
(t)
j ) ·m(t)j − g(t)2 (s(t)j ) · c(t)j , a(t)j = app
g
(t)
3 (s
(t)
j ) ·m(t)j − g(t)4 (s(t)j ) · c(t)j − g(t)5 (s) · c0, a(t)j = rev
0, a
(t)
j = rej
Throughout the entire paper, we assume that a finite number of transactions oc-
curred in each period, and the reward of each transaction is bounded. Theorem
3.1 gives the condition that Model (Perfect) has a unique optimal solution.
Theorem 3.1. If (1) number of transaction occurred in each period is finite
and margin/loss from each transaction is bounded, and (2) the arriving process
of transactions is stationary, then there exists an optimal profit satisfying
u∗(S) = max
a
E
 N∑
j=1
Raj (wj , S)
+ α ·∑
S′
QS,S′(a) · u∗(S′)
 ,
and there is a unique solution to this equation.
Theorem 3.1 is guaranteed by contracting mapping argument and directly
follows Theorem 6.2.3 and Theorem 6.2.5 from [11].
3.2. Incomplete Information and Intractableness of (Perfect) Model
Although Theorem 3.1 provides solid guidance to find the optimal control
strategy, there are several issues of implementing Model Perfect in reality.
(1) Exact state information is unavailable: State information, i.e. g-functions,
can only be inferred using partially mature data, since data maturity lead
time is a latent random variable with range [0, L]. We have no way to
obtain the true time point of maturity for each transaction until the trans-
action is eventually marked as a chargeback. However, through analyzing
the historical data we do have the knowledge that after L periods of time
the fraud status (having chargeback or not) should be all mature;
(2) Reward functions are not entirely exact: Reward functions, R(·), are based
on estimations of g-functions, and w(t) is not known a priori. Therefore,
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reward functions could vary due the different estimated g-functions and
the different w(t);
(3) Transition probability matrix Q does not have an explicit form: State
space S has extremely high dimension (five g-functions estimated at (s¯+1)
risk scores); Action space A has exponential dimension that explosively
increase as number of transactions increases (A(t) = {app, rev, rej}N(t)
has 3N
(t)
possible decision sequences).
The lag of data maturity and the curse of dimensionality lead to the fact that
Model (Perfect) is intractable. Thus we propose three approximate dynamic
heuristics to obtain suboptimal control decisions. Details of these different con-
trol algorithms will be demonstrated in Section 4.
All dynamic control heuristics require a base module which utilizes incom-
plete information, such as the mature old data and the partially mature recent
data, to infer future g-functions in these heuristic algorithms. Data mining
results suggest that correlations exist between recent l period’s partially ma-
ture chargeback rate and bank/MR behavior patterns. This fact implies that
we should track partially mature chargeback rate of transactions portfolio in
period t − l, so that g-functions can be properly calibrated. This happens to
have the same view with business intuitions in multi-party fraud control: If
bank and MR learn that recently received transactions have high chargeback
rate, they will become more conservative with their decision making by reduc-
ing the number of authorization/approval decisions to prevent more undesir-
able chargebacks. Two decision environment modules, Current Environment
Inference (CEI) module and Future Environment Inference (FEI) module, are
adopted from [31]. Discussion of these two modules are out of the scope of
the current paper, we suggest readers refer to [31] for details of CEI and FEI
modules. CEI and FEI utilize historical data to produce g-function estimations,
which contribute to the data-driven property of our risk control framework.
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4. Dynamic Risk Control Algorithms
In this section, we propose three different dynamic risk control algorithms:
Naive, Myopic and Prospective control. Naive control is the simplest heuristic
algorithm that only uses fully mature data before period t−L. Myopic control
estimates the current decision environment using CEI module with both mature
and immature data in period t−l. The most complex control model, Prospective
control, further takes into account that current decision will influence not only
the current profit but also the near future profit. Three models are demonstrated
in Section 4.1 - 4.3.
4.1. Naive control
Figure 3 depicts decision flow of naive control. At the beginning of period t,
decision engine uses mature data before period t− L to estimate g-functions.
Figure 3: Naive dynamic control
In period t ∈ T , let Sˆ(t)=(g(t−L)1 (s), g(t−L)2 (s), g(t−L)3 (s), g(t−L)4 (s), g(t−L)5 (s) :
∀s) be the estimated current state, and A(t) = {app, rev, rej}N(t) be the ac-
tion space of period t. Then feasible action sequence has a form of a(t) =
{a(t)1 , a(t)2 , ..., a(t)N(t)}, where a
(t)
j ∈ {app, rev, rej}. Naive model disregards the
future effects. For N (t) transactions take place in period t, we need to solve the
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following model to get action sequence a(t)∗.
max
a(t)∈A(t)
E
N(t)∑
j=1
Rˆ
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j )
 (Naive-t)
s.t. E[Rˆapp(w(t)j )] = g
(t−L)
1 (s
(t)) ·m− g(t−L)2 (s(t)) · c
E[Rˆrev(w(t)j )] = g
(t−L)
3 (s
(t)) ·m− g(t−L)4 (s(t)) · c− g(t−L)5 (s(t)) · c0
E[Rˆrej(w(t)j )] = 0
A(t) = {app, rev, rej}N(t)
Naive control repeats this procedure for each period t. Theorem 4.1 claims
that (Naive-t) can be easily solved by greedily choosing the decision option that
yields the highest expected reward for each incoming transaction. Details about
Naive control policy is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 4.1. Optimal action sequence a(t)∗ of (Naive-t) can be obtained by
the greedy algorithm, i.e. for w
(t)
j ∈ w(t), sequentially set
a
(t)∗
j = arg max
a
(t)
j ∈{app,rev,rej}
E[Rˆ
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j )]
Proof. The rewards of different transactions are independent, and for period t,
(Naive-t) can be decomposed into N (t) sub-maximization problems. Thus the
greedy algorithm can solve (Naive-t) exactly.
Algorithm 1 Naive Dynamic Control
Repeat for period t ∈ T :
1: Estimate g
(t−L)
1 (s), g
(t−L)
2 (s), g
(t−L)
3 (s), g
(t−L)
4 (s) and g
(t−L)
5 (s) us-
ing all the data until the end of period t − L, let Sˆ(t) =
(g
(t−L)
1 (s), g
(t−L)
2 (s), g
(t−L)
3 (s), g
(t−L)
4 (s), g
(t−L)
5 (s) : ∀s);
2: for j = 1, 2, ..., N (t) do
3: a
(t)∗
j = arg maxa(t)j ∈{app,rev,rej}
E[Rˆ
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j )].
4: end for
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4.2. Myopic control
Figure 4 shows the decision flow of myopic control.
Figure 4: Myopic dynamic control
This control model is designed to resolve the pattern recognition lag is-
sue due to the delay of data maturity. We adopt CEI module from [31] to
infer current period decision environments. Mathematically, CEI maps ma-
tured g-function trajectories (g
(t′)
1 (s), g
(t′)
2 (s), g
(t′)
3 (s), g
(t′)
4 (s), and g
(t′)
5 (s):
t′ ≤ t− L) and partially mature chargeback rate ρ(t−l)PCB to estimate g-functions
(gˆ
(t)
1 (s), gˆ
(t)
2 (s), gˆ
(t)
3 (s), gˆ
(t)
4 (s) and gˆ
(t)
5 (s)) at current period, t.
gˆ
(t)
1 (s)
gˆ
(t)
2 (s)
gˆ
(t)
3 (s)
gˆ
(t)
4 (s)
gˆ
(t)
5 (s)

=

Φˆ
(t)
1
(
s, g
(t′)
1 (s), ρ
(t−l)
PCB
)
Φˆ
(t)
2
(
s, g
(t′)
2 (s), ρ
(t−l)
PCB
)
Φˆ
(t)
3
(
s, g
(t′)
3 (s), ρ
(t−l)
PCB
)
Φˆ
(t)
4
(
s, g
(t′)
4 (s), ρ
(t−l)
PCB
)
Φˆ
(t)
5
(
s, g
(t′)
5 (s), ρ
(t−l)
PCB
)

(CEI)
where ρt−lPCB is calculated by
ρt−lPCB =
 # of chargeback transactions
in week t− l occurred before week t

(# of finally approved transactions in week t− l) .
Then for N (t) transactions occurred in period t, Myopic Dynamic Control model
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solves the following model to get action sequence a(t)∗.
max
a(t)∈A(t)
E
N(t)∑
j=1
Rˆ
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j )
 (Myopic-t)
s.t. E[Rˆapp(w(t)j )] = gˆ
(t)
1 (s
(t)) ·m− gˆ(t)2 (s(t)) · c
E[Rˆrev(w(t)j )] = gˆ
(t)
3 (s
(t)) ·m− gˆ(t)4 (s(t)) · c− gˆ(t)5 (s(t)) · c0
E[Rˆrej(w(t)j )] = 0
A(t) = {app, rev, rej}N(t)
CEI module is updated at the beginning of each period and (Myopic-t) is solved
during each period to provide optimal control actions. Theorem 4.2 provides
theoretical guarantee that (Myopic-t) can be solved by the greedy method. De-
tails of Myopic control policy is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4.2. The optimal action sequence a(t)∗ of (Myopic-t) can be obtained
by the greedy algorithm, i.e. for w
(t)
j ∈ w(t), sequentially set
a
(t)∗
j = arg max
a
(t)
j ∈{app,rev,rej}
E[Rˆ
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j )]
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is similar with proof of Theorem 4.1 and thus
omitted.
Algorithm 2 Myopic Dynamic Control
Repeat for period t ∈ T :
1: Calculate g
(t−L)
1 (s), g
(t−L)
2 (s), g
(t−L)
3 (s), g
(t−L)
4 (s) and g
(t−L)
5 (s) using all the
data until the end of period t − L, calculate ρ(t−l)PCB using partially mature
data in period t− l;
2: Estimate gˆ
(t)
1 (s), gˆ
(t)
2 (s), gˆ
(t)
3 (s), gˆ
(t)
4 (s) and gˆ
(t)
5 (s) using CEI module, and
let Sˆ(t) = (gˆ
(t)
1 (s), gˆ
(t)
2 (s), gˆ
(t)
3 (s), gˆ
(t)
4 (s) : ∀s);
3: for j = 1, 2, ..., N (t) do
4: a
(t)∗
j = arg maxa(t)j ∈{app,rev,rej}
E[Rˆ
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j )].
5: end for
6: Re-train and update CEI module.
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4.3. Prospective control
Figure 5 depicts decision flow of prospective control. Prospective control
Figure 5: Prospective dynamic control
model has a similar CEI module that can diminish pattern recognition lag. In
addition, FEI module is adopted from [31] to estimate future decision environ-
ment change due to the action taken at current period. These environments
are characterized by the g-functions of period t and t+ l. Similar with Myopic
control, in period t ∈ T , we use the output of the CEI module as the state
estimation, i.e. Sˆ(t) = (gˆ
(t)
1 (s), gˆ
(t)
2 (s), gˆ
(t)
3 (s), gˆ
(t)
4 (s), gˆ
(t)
5 (s) : ∀s). Action space
of period t is still A(t) = {app, rev, rej}N(t) . While different from previous two
control models, prospective control considers future effects caused by the cur-
rent decisions: the action sequences will play a role on the behavior patterns of
bank and MR in period t + l. For N (t) transactions occurred in period t, we
need to solve the following model to get our action sequence a(t)∗.
max
a(t)∈A(t)
E
N(t)∑
j=1
Rˆ
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j )
+ λ ·∆ (Prospective-t)
s.t. E[Rˆapp(w(t)j )] = gˆ
(t)
1 (s
(t)
j ) ·m(t)j − gˆ(t)2 (s(t)j ) · c(t)j , ∀j
E[Rˆrev(w(t)j )] = gˆ
(t)
3 (s
(t)
j ) ·m(t)j − gˆ(t)4 (s(t)j ) · c(t)j − gˆ(t)5 (s(t)j ) · c0, ∀j
E[Rˆrej(w(t)j )] = 0, ∀j
A(t) = {app, rev, rej}N(t)
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where λ is a discount factor, and ∆ is a reference future profit of period t+ l. A
reference sample from mature control group is bootstrapped from mature data
set in order to provide reference future profit ∆. Let this reference transaction
set sample be w˜(t+l) = {w˜(t+l)1 , w˜(t+l)2 , ..., w(t+l)m } with m elements. FEI module
includes two sub-procedures:
(1) Calculate estimated chargeback rate of period t, ρ
(t)
CB : at a given time point
during period t, suppose we have received n′ transaction request, and our
decision action sequence is (at1, ..., a
t
n′), we can then estimate charge back
rate of period t,
ρˆ
(t)
CB =
1∑n′
j=1 δ(atj 6=Rej.)
 n′∑
j=1
gˆt2(s
t
j) · δ(atj=App.) +
n′∑
j=1
gˆt4(s
t
j) · δ(atj=Rev.)

(3)
where δ(·) is the indicator function.
(2) Predict future g-functions (g
(t+l)
1 (s), g
(t+l)
2 (s), g
(t+l)
3 (s), g
(t+l)
4 (s) and g
(t+l)
5 (s))
with matured g-function trajectories (g
(t′)
1 (s), g
(t′)
2 (s), g
(t′)
3 (s), g
(t′)
4 (s), and
g
(t′)
5 (s): t
′ ≤ t− L) and estimate weekly full chargeback rate ρ(t)CB . FEI is
trained with mature data and
gˆ
(t)
1 (s)
gˆ
(t)
2 (s)
gˆ
(t)
3 (s)
gˆ
(t)
4 (s)
gˆ
(t)
5 (s)

=

Ψˆ
(t)
1
(
s, g
(t′)
1 (s), ρˆ
(t)
CB
)
Ψˆ
(t)
2
(
s, g
(t′)
2 (s), ρˆ
(t)
CB
)
Ψˆ
(t)
3
(
s, g
(t′)
3 (s), ρˆ
(t)
CB
)
Ψˆ
(t)
4
(
s, g
(t′)
4 (s), ρˆ
(t)
CB
)
Ψˆ
(t)
5
(
s, g
(t′)
5 (s), ρˆ
(t)
CB
)

(FEI)
(Prospective-t) is hard to solve due to high dimension of a(t) and non-analytic
form of ∆. A similar real-time updated greedy heuristic is introduced to obtain
a sub optimal solution for (Prospective-t). This Real-time Greedy Heuristic
(RGH) allows us to update estimation of ρˆ
(t)
CB on the fly and to adjust our
strategy within period t. Figure 6 illustrates the logics of RGH within period t.
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Figure 6: Real-time greedy heuristic demonstration
Let time τ be a decision time point in period t where transaction w
(t)
n1+1
occurs and risk team needs to make decision either to approve, reject or manual
review this transaction. Suppose from st, starting point of period t, to current
decision point τ , we have observed n1 transactions. Hence, we can estimate the
chargeback rate of period t, if we approve, review or reject w
(t)
n1+1
using Eq. (4).
ρˆ
(t)
CB(τ) =
1∑n1+1
j=1 δ(atj 6=Rej.)
n1+1∑
j=1
gˆt2(s
t
j) · δ(atj=App.) +
n1+1∑
j=1
gˆt4(s
t
j) · δ(atj=Rev.)

(4)
We further estimate the expected reward of approval, review or rejection of
w
(t)
n1+1
. Note that the future effect is first averaged to reward per transaction
and then discounted by a factor of λ.
RFapp(w
(t)
n1+1
) = E[Rˆapp(w(t)n1+1)] +
λ
m
∆τ,app (5a)
RFrev(w
(t)
n1+1
) = E[Rˆrev(w(t)n1+1)] +
λ
m
∆τ,rev (5b)
RFrej(w
(t)
n1+1
) = E[Rˆrej(w(t)n1+1)] +
λ
m
∆τ,rej (5c)
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and for a ∈ {app, rev, rej},
∆τ,a = (6)
max
a(t+l)∈A˜(t+l)
E
[
m∑
k=1
Rˆ
a
(t)
k
(w˜
(t+l)
k )
]
s.t. E[Rˆapp(w˜(t+l)k )] = gˆ
(t+l)
1 (s˜
(t+l)
k ) · m˜(t+l)k − gˆ(t+l)2 (s˜(t+l)k ) · c˜(t+l)k ,
E[Rˆrev(w˜(t+l)k )] = gˆ
(t+l)
3 (s˜
(t+l)
k ) · m˜(t+l)k − gˆ(t+l)4 (s˜(t+l)k ) · c˜(t+l)k
− gˆ(t+l)5 (s˜(t+l)k ) · c0,
E[Rˆrej(w˜(t+l)k )] = 0,
A˜(t+2) = {app, rev, rej}m
where ρˆ
(t)
CB(τ) are calculated using Eq. (4), and gˆ
(t+l)
(·) is derived by (FEI).
RGH sequentially assigns action that has the largest prospective reward to each
incoming transaction. For w
(t)
j ∈ w(t), we sequentially set
a
(t)∗
j = arg max
a
(t)
j ∈{App.,Rev.,Rej.}
RF
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j ). (Prospective-RGH)
Prospective control algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3.
5. Field Tests on Microsoft E-commerce
Field tests were conducted to exam the performances of these three dynamic
models. Testing dataset was extracted from a sub-unit of Microsoft E-commerce
business. We sample no more than 3% of total transactions as the testing data
set. For transactions in the testing set, we recorded decisions in our database
while we flipped all final rejected transactions to final approval, so that we could
obtain unbiased chargeback signals for model training and profit calculation. We
set the length of the testing period to one week and tested all dynamic control
model paralleling with current Microsoft inline decision engine.
Our data indicated that maximum lead time for the data maturity was L =
12, and the recent partially mature reference time was l = 2. The testing time
window is 14 weeks, and the bank and MR decisions for each transaction are kept
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Algorithm 3 Prospective Dynamic Control
Repeat for period t ∈ T :
1: Calculate g
(t−L)
1 (s), g
(t−L)
2 (s), g
(t−L)
3 (s), g
(t−L)
4 (s) and g
(t−L)
5 (s) using all the
data until the end of period t − L, calculate ρ(t−l)PCB using partially mature
data in period t− l;
2: Estimate gˆ
(t)
1 (s), gˆ
(t)
2 (s), gˆ
(t)
3 (s), gˆ
(t)
4 (s) and gˆ
(t)
5 (s) using CEI module, and
let Sˆ(t) = (gˆ
(t)
1 (s), gˆ
(t)
2 (s), gˆ
(t)
3 (s), gˆ
(t)
4 (s) : ∀s);
3: Initialize gˆ
(t+2)
1 (s), gˆ
(t+2)
2 (s), gˆ
(t+2)
3 (s), gˆ
(t+2)
4 (s) and gˆ
(t+2)
5 (s) by setting
them equal to gˆ
(t)
1 (s), gˆ
(t)
2 (s), gˆ
(t)
3 (s), gˆ
(t)
4 (s) and gˆ
(t)
5 (s) respectively;
4: for j = 1, 2, ..., N (t) do
5: Calculate ρˆ
(t)
CB(τj) for a
(t)
j ∈ {app, rev, rej} using Eq.(4);
6: Calculate future reference profits ∆τ,a using Eq.(6);
7: Calculate prospective profits RˆF
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j ) and set
a
(t)∗
j = arg max
a
(t)
j ∈{app,rev,rej}
E[RˆF
a
(t)
j
(w
(t)
j )].
8: Update chargeback rate estimation ρˆ
(t)
CB using Eq.(3), and calculate
gˆ
(t+2)
1 (s), gˆ
(t+2)
2 (s), gˆ
(t+2)
3 (s), gˆ
(t+2)
4 (s) and gˆ
(t+2)
5 (s).
9: end for
10: Re-train and update CEI and FEI modules.
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identical for different control methods to ensure apple-to-apple comparison. The
historical data continued to be maturing while the testing time moved forward.
For Naive and Myopic controls, the risk decision engine was updated weekly
(g-functions and (CEI) module was retrained at the beginning of each period).
For Prospective control, the risk decision engine refreshed the belief of current
g-functions, (CEI) module and (FEI) module once a week, while estimations of
current week chargeback rate and future g-functions in real-time were updated.
Due to the Microsoft’s confidentiality requirements, the name of the E-commerce
sub-unit is muted, and this section only includes the summarized feature values
that were aggregated over a 14-week of transaction period to demonstrate the
usability of Naive, Myopic and Prospective control models. The discount factor
λ in Prospective control model was tuned using K-fold cross validation at the
beginning of the testing and is a fixed valued, 0.12, throughout the 14 week
testing periods.
(a) # of approve (b) # of review (c) # of reject
Figure 7: Counts of Different Types of Risk Decisions Madevolume
We first studied numbers of different risk control operations (approve, review,
and reject) out of total testing transactions. Figure 7 summarizes counts of
different risk control decisions made by the current Microsoft’s decision engine
and three proposed dynamic control engines. Over the 14 weeks testing period,
the dynamic control engines gradually captured the decision accuracy of the
manual review group. All of the three models learned the fact that manual
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review agents overly rejected non-fraud transactions, and thus started to cut
off the volume of transactions submitted to the manual review team. Figure
7a suggests that all three dynamic models approved more transactions than
the current decision engine did. We can see later that these dynamic models
also enhanced decision accuracy significantly in Figure 8: the dynamic control
models not only approved more non-fraud transactions but also approved fewer
fraud transactions. All three models suggest sending fewer transactions for
manual review. Naive control aggressively decreased review volume to only
10% of the review volume suggested by current Microsoft’s decision engine, while
Myopic and Prospective control mildly decreased review volume to roughly 30%
of the original volume. As for the decision of rejection, Naive control increased
rejection volume by about 12%, while Myopic and Prospective control decreased
rejection volume by 12.5% and 9% respectively. We can also observe the fact
that Myopic and Prospective control models again enhanced decision accuracy
in Figure 8 by rejecting much fewer non-fraud transactions but more fraud
transactions.
Numbers of performance measures were used to validate the decision quality
of a risk control engine. First, we investigated the decision quality by comparing
the losses caused by wrong decisions. Two common performance metrics for this
are false negative (FN) loss and false positive (FP) loss. FN loss measures the
total loss of approving fraud transactions (wrongly approval), which consists
cost of goods and all related fees of chargeback. On the other hand, FP loss
measures the total loss of rejecting non-fraud transactions (wrongly rejection),
and it includes all the margins that should have been but not earned. We then
checked the manual review (MR) cost, which is the total labor cost of the human
review team. We found that when the risk engine submitted transactions that
included fewer frauds (true negative: rightful approval) to the manual review
teams, manual review teams tended to have a much more difficult time to make
accurate risk decisions since fraud patterns are less massive and recognizable.
Therefore, with more transactions sent to manual review teams, not only more
labor costs will arise, but the decision accuracy instability will likely to increase.
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Figure 8 summarizes aggregated improvement on FN loss, FP loss and MR
cost on the selected testing data set. Figure 8a shows the fact that all three
(a) FN loss difference in % (b) FP loss difference in % (c) MR cost difference in %
Figure 8: Aggregated improvement on FN loss, FP loss and MR cost
dynamic control methods made better ”approval” decisions by producing fewer
FN losses. Naive, Myopic and Prospective control model decreases FN loss by
8.48%, 7.32%, and 7.55% respectively. Figure 8b suggests that Naive control
model is relatively aggressive which rejected more non-fraud transactions and
yielded 9.49% more FP losses. Meanwhile, Myopic and Prospective control
mildly decrease FP loss by 4.73% and 3.05% respectively, and these two dynamic
control methods make more correct rejections. As mentioned earlier, all dynamic
decision engine found that MR had limited accuracy in detecting fraud. In this
way, Naive, Myopic and Prospective control model deceased transactions submit
for review by 93.0%, 64.2%, and 64.7%.
Second, we compare the differences of total profits and total chargeback
rates among three dynamic control methods and current Microsoft’s risk con-
trol method. Providing higher profit is the ultimate goal for business operations.
While on the other hand, risk control team also needs to ensure the new dynamic
control methods do not escalate the chargeback rate for merchants. We need to
ensure that proposed dynamic control methods can produce higher profit but
not increase (or even lower) the chargeback rate.
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Table 1: Aggregated performance improvements in profit and chargeback rate
Naive Myopic Prospective
14 week aggregated
improvement on
testing set ($)
+ $ 79,962 + $ 97,863 + $ 96,693
Estimated annual
improvement on
selected sub-department ($)
+ $ 9,900,071 + $ 12,116,318 + $ 11,971,568
Relative chargeback
rate difference (%)
-0.72% -1.64% -2.98%
Table 1 summarizes insights of improvements in overall profit and chargeback
rate. The first row of Table 1 includes profit improvement on the testing set
calculated by (TotalProfit(Dynamic)−TotalProfit(Microsoft)). The second row ex-
trapolates total profit from training set to an estimated annual improvement on
the selected sub-unit. The third row reports the relative differences in propor-
tion on chargeback rates, calculated by
chargeback rate(Dynamic) − chargeback rate(Microsoft)
chargeback rate(Microsoft)
.
Over the 14 week testing period, Naive control contributed $79,962 more on
the testing portfolio while maintained a similar chargeback rate with current
Microsoft risk decision engine had. Naive control decreased chargeback rate
slightly by only 0.72% of Microsoft’s current chargeback rate. Myopic control
contributed to the largest profit improvement for $97,863 on the testing set.
Meanwhile, Myopic control decreased chargeback rate relatively for 1.64%. Fi-
nally, for Prospective control, it produced $96,693 more profit on the testing
transaction set, while provided the largest improvement on chargeback rate by
decreasing chargeback rate by 2.98%. The estimated annual improvements for
Naive, Myopic and Prospective control on selected sub-unit were $ 9,900,071, $
25
12,116,318, and $ 11,971,568 respectively by extrapolation.
We conclude this section with a few business takeaways. We have seen that
all three models have potentials for significantly improving company profit while
slightly decreasing chargeback rates. All three dynamic models enhanced deci-
sion qualities by decreasing FN losses, FP losses and MR costs. Although Naive
control model performed relatively aggressive in rejecting transactions, Myopic
and Prospective control made better rejection decisions by rejecting fewer non-
fraud transactions. All three dynamic methods had great performance with
approving more non-fraud transactions and rejecting more fraud transactions.
Artificial intelligence modules in these dynamic control models were well devel-
oped, and outperformed human review agents one most of the fraud decisions.
Manual review volumes decreased as expected, and hence MR labor costs were
reduced significantly.
6. Conclusion and Future Study
To minimize ad hoc human-made decision, and improve the accuracy and
robustness of the risk decision making, we investigated how to reach the optimal
action when if complete information is available. We defined our problem rig-
orously, characterized all profit related components in the current system and
investigated decision interactions between three different decision-making par-
ties. We acknowledged the fact that perfect information is unavailable in reality
and thus we designed three data-driven dynamic optimal control models, Naive
control, Myopic control, and Prospective control. These control models are
100% data-driven and self-trained/adapted in a real-time manner. As demon-
strated, these dynamic control models helped increase the profit significantly
by minimizing false negative loss, false positive loss, and manual review costs
by employing incomplete information, including long-term and short-term ma-
ture and partially-mature data. Meanwhile, the proposed control models also
slightly lowered chargeback rates as desired. The field test on sub-unit of Mi-
crosoft E-commerce suggested that the discriminative dynamic control models
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had better fraud detection performance than the current general score cut-off
control.
The research proposed in this paper can contribute greatly to both theoret-
ical and applied research on fraud detection for the systems that have problems
with incomplete information and decision looping effect due to multiple decision
parties. Its application is not limited to financial risk systems, but can also be
used for application and research in cyber-security, homeland security, conta-
gion disease screens etc.. Our future research will include information sharing
and information fusion. We will extend this current research to more complex
and realistic settings, where information sources are shared at different levels
among different risk control decision parties.
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